3. In order to build a market economy, the state was to assume regulatory functions and ensure control over the operation and restructuring of state owned enterprises. As the public sector was responsible for approximately 90% of GDP, the president would no doubt be the main arbiter for their directors.

The economy of Belarus was built during the Soviet period as part of the Soviet economic system. The economy continued functioning on the basis of the traditions instilled during the Soviet era, which affected the quality of management.

Under the totalitarian empire, economic turnover was regulated not only by law but also by directives from the Party. In 1991, this system collapsed; however, market mechanisms were not in place. The state withdrew from regulating economic processes, which resulted in the creation of a “wild” market.

The Belarusian economic elite needed a “strong man” capable of establishing order, even if this meant returning to old methods of managing the economy: a person to whom executives of state owned enterprises would be directly responsible.

The economy of Belarus is oriented mainly at the Russian market. In order to ensure sufficient guarantees that the Russian partners would fulfil their obligations, a leader able to maintain good relationships (including personal relations) with representatives of the Russian political elite was necessary*.

The above-mentioned group of pragmatics was represented by MPs Leanid Sinitsyn, Viktar Kuchynski, and Ivan Tsitsyankow as well as by state officials such as Uladzimir Harkun and Mikhail Myasnikovich. The group believed that Kebich would not have sufficient political resources to be the true guarantor of their power and interests. They did not need a “first among equals”, as Kebich would have been, but an authoritative leader, a charismatic politician whose popularity would guarantee their own stability; which was precisely their goal — attaining a level of safety while enjoying the privileges gained through dividing state property. That purpose could not be fulfilled via a mere pocket majority in the Supreme Soviet and control over most of the media. The way to true stability was to be paved by total control over Parliament and the media. Stability in their minds was the concentration of all power in the hands of their own politician and the possibility to do whatever it took against those who threatened their stature and interests.

Only a new face could fit that role; a person of the same political persuasion, a communist, an outsider, someone from the generation who had not had time to assume a major position before the Soviet Union collapsed and the Communist Party banned (in 1991). This individual had to be an aggressive, non-compromised, charismatic young politician.

The candidate fitting all the above criteria, Alyaksandar Lukashenka, stood out distinctly against the general political backdrop. Lukashenka was a deputy of the 12th Supreme Soviet and a true outsider, a former director of the “Haradzets” state farm in the Shklow district. Moreover, in 1993 he was just 39 years old!

The date the nomenclature group decided on Lukashenka is known. On June 4, 1993, the Supreme Soviet established a new body: a temporary commission to fight corruption. The establishment of this commission, in a Parliament split into groups and factions, was not an internal parliamentary affair, but had to be approved at the highest level that would also have to nominate its chairman. The entire matter was orchestrated by the designers of the “president Lukashenka” project.

Since May 1993, Parliament had spent increasingly more time devoted to the issues of introducing the office of president and the advantages of a presidential republic. On June 4, the commission chaired by Lukashenka was established, moving him into position prior to the electoral campaign. In addition, a small group started to accumulate around this commission of 10 MPs; a group that was to develop into the entourage of president Lukashenka.

Competitors in the presidential election campaign did not consider Lukashenka to be serious, independent or worthy of a fully-fledged, no-holes-barred campaign. However, he felt no restraint in punching right and left. He went after the “national radicals” as well as the “corrupt nomenclature” and “party-mafia bosses.”

The only person who could put real obstacles in the way of the “president Lukashenka” project was Vyachaslaw Kebich, the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Running for president, he had sufficient political resources to counter Lukashenka. However, people who were, in fact, working for the benefit of his rival filled key posts in Kebich’s campaign team. This included Mikhail Myasnikovich, Kebich’s closest aide, as well as Syarhey Linh and people associated with them*. Myasnikovich and Linh were members of the old elite and both had made careers during the Soviet era**.

Kebich’s trustees convinced him that he was guaranteed to win the election. Polls sponsored by his campaign team showed that 27 % of voters were supporting him against 13 % for Lukashenka, his closest rival.

The media, which were subordinate to the executive branch (TV, radio, large national newspapers like “Sovietskaya Belorussiya” and “Zvyazda”), primarily targeted their attacks at the democrats, specifically Zyanon Paznyak, Stanislaw Shushkevich, and Henadz Karpenka and not at Lukashenka, Kebich’s most dangerous competitor.

Unlike those delivered against the democratic candidates, the very few attacks that were launched against Alyaksandar Lukashenka were extremely unprofessional. These attacks with negative PR backfired on Kebich.

As an example, Ivan Antanovich, a pro-Kebich publicist, called Lukashenka a nationalist in a Belarusian radio programme on June 7, 1994, only because the candidate had once delivered a speech in Belarusian. Obviously, that action could only draw some democratic voters, mainly Belarusian speakers, onto Lukashenka’s side.

Meanwhile, Kebich directed his main effort at campaigning against ex-speaker Stanislaw Shushkevich*.

Kebich believed he would win an easy victory right up to the end to the campaign. On June 1, 1994, signatures for candidates were counted with the following results: 411,000 for Prime Minister Kebich, 217,000 for BPF leader Paznyak, 184,000 for communist leader Novikaw and Lukashenka trailing with a modest 156,000 signatures.

On June 18, the national media announced that an attempt had been made on the life of one of the candidates: shots had been fired at the car** carrying Alyaksandar Lukashenka while driving from Vitsebsk near the town of Lyozna. This incident had a significant impact on mobilising Lukashenka’s electorate.

The first round of the presidential elections, held on June 24, revealed the distribution of political forces in the country. The curtain was up; it became evident who would be the first president of Belarus. Having succeeded in getting the planned effect from their “Lyozna sketch,” the authors of the “president Lukashenka” project were inspired to continue their play. On the morning of June 28, when the first round results were already known and Lukashenka was seen in a new light, another act was played out. In the very heart of the capital, in the House of Government, police carried out an attempt on the would-be president and his trustees*, trying to bar Lukashenka from entering his office. In full compliance with canons of the genre, Lukashenka and his aides won the fight and broke through to their room.

That event was accordingly highlighted by the national media in a completely new tone: everyone understood that the main character of the news stories was to become president in less than two weeks. The media coverage featured some note-worthy details: the order not to let Lukashenka into his office was allegedly issued by Major General Uladzimir Danko, Minister of Interior; the policemen were commanded by a colonel; severe bodily injuries were inflicted on the presidential candidate (photographs showed blood stains on Lukashenka’s clothes).

Lukashenka was given an opportunity to use the mass media to tell the entire country the reasons for that clash, alleging that corrupt law enforcement officials were trying to prevent him from taking power in fear of their inevitable punishment for the crimes they had committed against the people.

The Lyozna attempt and the police attack in the House of Government clearly testify that top officials of the KGB, the Ministry of Interior and Public Prosecutors Office were involved in the “president Lukashenka” project; or at least that they were closely connected with the those behind Lukashenka*.

The episode in the House of Government occurred when there was no longer anyone blocking Lukashenka’s way to the presidency: Kebich, stunned by the major and unexpected defeat and the blatant betrayal by his closest entourage, withdrew from further campaigning. The second round of elections was held on July 8, with no surprises. On July 12, Kebich’s government resigned.

The government established by Lukashenka, or more precisely, the composition of the government that was operating during 1994–95, was labelled by the regime’s opponents as “the young wolves.” However, this label was quite mistaken, ignoring some very important appointments (e.g., Mikhail Myasnikovich and Syarhey Linh as Deputy Prime Ministers). Later, in 1995, the government changed radically. The most important changes worth mentioning at this point involved Viktar Hanchar, who resigned as deputy prime minister in January 1994 (later becoming a democratic politician) and Uladzimir Zamyatalin, an odious political instructor, who was assigned director of the socio-political information department of the presidential administration in April 1995.

Zamyatalin’s assignment marked the beginning of further changes. The chief ideologist of Kebich’s government, Zamyatalin obtained more room for manoeuvre in Lukashenka’s government. Wave by wave, members of the communist nomenclature began to replace professional administrators.

The first presidential elections in Belarus resembled a well-directed play. It had it all: a struggle between good and evil, a heroic main character, intrigue and, finally, a happy ending: the victory of good personified as the hero.

THE SPLIT IN STATE ORGANS OF POWER AS A RESULT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN NOVEMBER 1996

Iryna YEKADUMAVA

President Lukashenka’s authoritarian style of rule resulted in a constitutional crisis in November 1996. The situation that began on November 24, 1996, and became more pronounced on July 20, 1999, was characterised by the coexistence of legitimate institutions without power and illegitimate institutions exercising power. Moreover, both sides functioned so that informal bodies had more authority than formal bodies. Alyaksandar Lukashenka managed to retain power after the end of his first presidential term as defined by the 1994 Constitution under which he was elected through re-organising the highest bodies of state power, strengthening the highest organs of executive power as well as the power forces*, installing control over the media and every aspect of social life as well as using administrative resources during elections. The opposition, unable to counter this process, assumed and consolidated the role of defenders of the constitution and the authoritative representatives of the Belarusian public.

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The highest, permanent and only legislative body in Belarus is the Supreme Soviet. Article 83 of the 1994 Constitution endowed it with the authority to call nation-wide referendums, adopt and make changes to the constitution, elect the Constitutional Court and the heads of other high courts as well as approve the national budget1.

The process of splitting legislative power in Belarus became apparent when the first conflict erupted between the president and the 12th Supreme Soviet in April 1995. Despite the smaller presence of the opposition in the 13th Supreme Soviet, the Parliament continued to oppose the president: against the wishes of Lukashenka, rather than former Prime Minister Vyachaslaw Kebich, Parliament elected Syamyon Sharetski as speaker. Sharetski was chairman of the Agrarian Party, and vowed to push for market reforms, retaining the sovereignty of Belarus and the inviolability of the constitution.

The system of checks and balances within the 1994 constitution was tested, resulting in the failure of the president to concentrate all state power in his hands. However, as a majority of the people voted ‘yes’ in the 1995 referendum to give the president the right to dissolve Parliament, he claimed the right to ignore the law. The changes in the constitution, initiated by the president, tried to adapt legislation to the results of the referendum. To do so, the Legal Consultative Council*, a special body of the executive branch, was established. When the presidential initiative to hold a referendum concerning amendments to the constitution was announced, Parliament was unable to stop it**. Aware of the success of presidential initiatives in plebiscites and the futility of the tactic of not appealing to the people, the only thing that the Supreme Soviet could do to counter the attempts to amend the constitution was add its own questions to the referendum. Those questions, if voted in favour, would have rendered senseless those put forth by Lukashenka and not allowed interpreting the results of the voting in favour of the executive branch. Moreover, the communists and agrarians developed an alternative draft constitution that did not include the post of president.

At the request of speaker Syamyon Sharetski who questioned the legitimacy of putting forth the new drafts of the constitution for a referendum, the Constitutional Court considered the Supreme Soviet resolution, issued on September 6, 1996, in regard to holding the referendum. On November 4, the Constitutional Court ruled that both versions of the Constitution involve changes to the organisation of the state and therefore the results of the referendum cannot be mandatory. Even the voting ballots stressed the consultative nature of the referendum. Nevertheless, its results were used as a basis for re-organising the entire structure of the highest institutions of power in the country.

Under Article 91 of the Constitution of 1996, the Belarusian Parliament (the National Assembly) consists of two chambers: the House of Representatives (110 deputies) and the Council of the Republic (64 deputies). The upper chamber, the Council of the Republic, is simultaneously the chamber of territorial representation. The six regions of Belarus and the city of Minsk elect eight representatives each, with eight more appointed by the president.

The first rehearsal of the new Parliament’s session was staged even before the referendum, on November 19, when 80 deputies loyal to the president accepted an invitation from MP Ivan Pashkevich and attended a conference in the presidential administration building, thus leaving the Supreme Soviet sitting without a quorum. The actual re-organisation of Parliament began on November 25, before the official announcement of the referendum results. Once again, MPs were invited to the presidential administration building, where each of them was offered to sign a standard application to enrol in the House of Representatives of the National Assembly. On the first day, 62 out of the 84 invited deputies signed the application. The following day according to official information, 117 deputies met at the presidential administration building to form the ruling bodies of the House of Representatives. At the suggestion of Lukashenka, Anatol Malafeyew, the former first secretary of the CPB Central Committee was elected speaker; while the position of deputy speaker went to Uladzimir Kanaplyow, an old friend of Lukashenka’s. The House of Representatives was joined by 70% (52) of MPs from the “Zhoda” (Accord) faction as well as half of the communists (21) and agrarians (24). On November 28, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution to revoke the appeal filed earlier by members of the Supreme Soviet to the Constitutional Court, thus stopping the renewal of the campaign to impeach the president. Meanwhile, 61 members of the Supreme Soviet who had signed the appeal and remained loyal to the 1994 Constitution never revoked their signatures.

A total of 50 MPs refused to file applications for membership in the new Parliament. While the new Parliament was in the process of being established 70 deputies held a session of the Supreme Soviet. They adopted a statement on behalf of the Supreme Soviet presidium refusing to acknowledge the referendum results. As the debate concerning the situation unfolded MP Andrey Klimaw proposed issuing an order to arrest Alyaksandar Lukashenka. This was opposed by Mikhail Varanovich, who called upon the deputies to acknowledge defeat and participate in establishing the new Parliament. However, the majority of MPs decided to take a moderate stand: to continue working in order to prevent the legitimisation of state institutions based on the referendum results. The deputies finally hammered out an agenda for the next day that consisted in a session devoted to the economy with major political parties in attendance. In the end, the Supreme Soviet building was closed “for repairs” on November 28, and subsequent meetings lost any resemblance to parliamentary sessions.

Recognised by the international community*, the Supreme Soviet lost the possibility to conduct legislative and representative functions as it lacked the capacity to ensure the fulfilment of its resolutions. From February 1997, the members of the Supreme Soviet (not more than 50 people) continued their work in the capacity of political experts, no longer calling their meetings parliamentary sessions and opting for the modest term “meetings of deputies.” Unlike members of the House of Representatives, they were extremely active in debate, however, the effects of their work were limited to passing political statements and founding yet other intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary structures. As their international activities were the most fruitful, the deputies were mostly interested in discussing the composition of delegations to foreign countries.

In terms of domestic politics, the most important among the first initiatives of the dissolved Supreme Soviet was the establishment of a commission, chaired by Viktar Hanchar, for evaluating the legality of the president’s activities. On October 14, 1997, deputies approved the commission’s report and signed a statement that it was no longer possible for Alyaksandar Lukashenka to retain presidential authority. The statement, like most of the Supreme Soviet’s decisions, had great symbolic meaning, but in practice resulted in the persecution of the MPs for their parliamentary activities*. In fact, the statement was only a half measure, the first step towards renewing the impeachment procedure and therefore it was very important for the meetings of the deputies to have a plenipotentiary status of Supreme Soviet sessions. A group of deputies, headed by Viktar Hanchar, compiled a series of documents for preparing and holding plenipotentiary sessions of the Supreme Soviet**. The deputies even began another signature drive for the impeachment of the president, while a resolution to take away deputy mandates from the members of the House of Representatives was blocked by the communists, agrarians, and some of the social democrats. As a result, the Supreme Soviet did not grant itself the right to call parliamentary sessions!

Thus, the Supreme Soviet retained legitimacy and the capacity to adopt political statements but lost any mechanism for their implementation as well as the authority to make decisions that would affect the Belarusian political apparatus. The National Assembly crafted by Lukashenka, underwent a reverse process and soon replaced political work with technical routine. It produced no bills during its first months while passing earlier drafts by the Supreme Soviet and presidential initiatives almost without consideration. Debate was checked by the unwillingness of MPs to be accused of disloyalty. Despite the participation of pro-Chykin communists in the House of Representatives and representatives of other pro-presidential parties after the election of October 15, 2000, members of the new Parliament distanced themselves from any expressed ideology. The degree of influence in Parliament was now determined by proximity to executive branch centres of power and personal ties to Uladzimir Kanaplyow, deputy speaker of the House of Representatives. The first groups of deputies began to form only during the 2nd session of the lower chamber elected in 2000. The faction “Adzinstva” (Unity), headed by Valyantsin Simirski, deputy chairman of the Commission for National Security, was founded in May 2001 “to strengthen the authority of state power among the population and assist in the process of integrating Belarus with Russia.” Prior to founding the 40-member faction, its leaders had contacted its Russian counterpart, a faction in the Duma with the same name. Another faction in the House of Representatives “Europe - Our Common Home” was modelled after the Duma’s “Euroclub.” Anatol Krasutski, deputy chairman of the Commission for International Affairs and CIS Relations, led this 14-member faction. Its main aim was “to accelerate the process of legitimising the National Assembly with respect to European inter-parliamentary organisations.” To date, there has yet to be a single party faction in the National Assembly.

Without a legitimate Parliament, Belarus has lost its representation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on February 22, 2001. At its session of July 6–10, 2001, the Assembly postponed the adoption of a resolution concerning Belarus’ representation until the subsequent session. Therefore, by the second presidential election, the legislature had not yet been recognised as legitimate.

JUDICIAL BRANCH

The turning point in the judiciary’s loss of independence was the replacement of the judges sitting on the Constitutional Court. The initial composition of the court, chaired by Valery Tsikhinya, remained unchanged for two and a half years. Until the referendum, the court attempted to exercise its authority as an arbiter in the conflict between the president and Parliament.

Although the conflict between the executive and judicial branches of powers was not as significant as that between the president and Parliament, Lukashenka considered some judges on the Constitutional Court to be “friends of the opposition.” Eventually opponents to the Constitutional Court stepped forward, so-called “official” lawyers acting on behalf of the presidential administration and other state institutions, representatives of the presidential Legal Consultative Council and jurists of the National Academy of Science. They barraged each Supreme Soviet resolution with critical articles and comments in the media. While the Constitutional Court followed the constitution and laws in effect, the “official lawyers” made references to a theory about two types of laws, legal and illegal laws. Simultaneously, the atmosphere within the Constitutional Court became increasingly more complicated as professional conflicts took on a personal character.

Following the referendum, five Constitutional Court judges submitted their resignations to the president.

On March 4, 1997, as 11 judges of the Constitutional Court were sworn in, president Lukashenka advised them not to become involved in politics. After the referendum, courts found themselves totally dependent on the executive branch.

Under such conditions, society attempted to take on some functions of the judiciary. On June 10, 1998, a proposal to hold a civil trial of officials charged with breaching the rights and freedoms of citizens was submitted by the National Executive Committee, an executive body founded by some members of the Supreme Soviet to act as a civil coalition government. As no legal basis existed for such a court to function in Belarus, the Committee decided to attach the status of a civil court to it. The court was to collect complaints and appeals from citizens in order to hear them when justice was restored in Belarus and proper court authorities were able to process them. The civil court was established within the Supreme Soviet presidium. It is to service both individuals and organisations.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Under Article 84 of the 1996 Constitution, as head of the executive branch, the president has the right to call referendums and elections to the House of Representatives and Council of the Republic, establish and reorganise the presidential administration and other state bodies, define the structure of the government, appoint and dismiss the prime minister, ministers, and other members of the government, chair governmental meetings as well as, upon the approval of the Council of the Republic, appoint members of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Supreme Economic Court. Article 10 gives the president the right to issue temporary decrees with the effect of law that are to be reviewed by the House of Representatives within three days and by the Council of Republic afterwards2.

Although Lukashenka himself jokingly referred to his constitutionally-based authority as “royal,” in practice the president tends to exceed it. For example, on December 24, 1998, president Lukashenka issued an edict calling for elections to local Soviets on the basis of the Law on Elections, which became effective only five days later. Many presidential decrees breach Belarusian legislation as well as international laws ratified by Belarus. Nevertheless, the president’s authority to issue such decrees is questionable for at least three reasons. First, the 1996 Constitution is illegitimate as it was adopted on the basis of a referendum, during which numerous infringements of the law were noted. Second, Article 101 of the Constitution defining the competence of the president contradicts Article 7 that asserts the supremacy of the Constitution. Third, president Lukashenka exercises legislative authority without a corresponding law having been adopted.

The system of governing created by Lukashenka results in the president exerting an influence in every area of state and social life as well as allows him to control these areas without being held responsible by specific laws. In particular, the economy is controlled by three structures: the presidential administration, the Council of Ministers and the Security Council. As the government’s tasks are unclear, its competence undefined and executive functions duplicated by the Council of Ministers and the presidential administration, it is obvious that the executive branch cannot function efficiently. Responsibility for economic efficiency is delegated to lower level authorities.

While Article 84 of the Constitution entitles the head of the executive branch to form “consultative, advisory and other bodies under presidential control,” their functions and competence are not specified. This provision allowed Lukashenka to legalise special services under the president’s exclusive control. This manoeuvre was employed even before 1996. (Even a special investigator from the Public Prosecutors Office failed to find out which troops beat up members of the 12th Supreme Soviet on the night of April 11–12, 1995). Despite being a board member of the Ministry of Interior, Mikhail Tsesavets (chairman of the main department of national defence) has not been subordinate to the minister since September 1996 (his department was instrumental in sabotaging the work of the Central Electoral Commission on November 15, 1996). The presidential security service, the competence of which is above the police and state security, is Lukashenka’s private security force.

The Supreme Soviet established a structure of executive power parallel to the president’s higher organs of power. The National Economic Council, chaired by deputy speaker Henadz Karpenka, was established in February 1997. Members of the “Civic Action” faction, who had initiated the establishment of the Council, occupied the leading positions in this body. As an executive body of the legitimate, although powerless, Parliament, the National Economic Council assumed the role of a civil coalition government. To increase the role of the public in its activity, on October 14, 1997, the Council was transformed into the National Executive Committee with a broader range of responsibilities. Other than the economy, NEC was responsible for defence, security, local self-government, education, science, as well as ethnic and religious affairs. It was declared that the selection of members to the Committee would be based on professionalism and representation. The composition was defined by the Supreme Soviet presidium after negotiations were held with political parties and civic movements. The presidium co-ordinates nominations with the leaders of the organisations that participated in establishing the Committee. A chairman directs this body (initially Henadz Karpenka, Mechyslaw Hryb since April 21, 1999). The Committee is a permanent executive body. Between monthly sessions, work is conducted by its committees (15 as of February 19, 1998). The National Executive Committee developed a programme of economic reforms, a plan for national development and, in February 1998, more than 50 bills were drafted. It issued a number of appeals to the public, state institutions of Belarus as well as to other countries and the international community. However, the Committee did not manage to influence the policy of the official authorities nor gain access to state owned television and radio. Until the end of 1999, the aims of the Committee were to unite the opposition in order to prevent destructive economic activities by the state and to defend citizen’s rights. In practice, the National Executive Committee served as an organisation co-ordinating the activities of various democratic forces as the forces of authoritarianism were consolidating.

CONCLUSIONS

Conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of power and the tendency of the president to exceed his authority are often presented by political scientists as problems characteristic for societies in transition. Formally, with the introduction of the new Constitution Belarus transitioned from a semi-presidential republic to a presidential republic; however, the changes were more profound as far as the country’s development is concerned. The referendum began a period characterised by a new relationship between the state and society. The opposition did not recognise the representative structures installed by the regime, which took elections outside the political arena. For the people, to vote now meant to participate in regenerating the power that exists independently from them. With the abolishment of the separation of power and cessation of electoral competition, the arbitrary intentions of the head of state are now the source of the law.

The Belarusian president no longer faced any serious resistance to his violations of the law. Having gained control over all branches of power, he eliminated the legal possibilities of effective influence on his office. Key positions in government were redistributed based on the criterion of loyalty. Informal institutions forced out formal institutions. The domination of informal institutions of power and the regular practice of para-constitutional methods by the state machine are evidence of the degradation of institutional structures in Belarusian society. The wide-ranging competence of the bureaucratic machine as well as the police and military forces do not increase government efficiency. The Belarusian economy and society are now mainly regulated by directives and repression. Because the areas of control that used to fall within the competence of the state are now within the domain of the individual, there are no longer any relations in society that are protected against the interference of the unpredictable regime.

As independent judicial authority has been abolished, unlawful activity can take on a legitimate veneer. In Belarus, this occurred through opposing the direct expression of popular will in regard to the law; the former being superior in mass consciousness. A popular revolution as a means of taking power, provides legitimacy to exercise that power. The head of state counted on the population’s legal nihilism and made infringement of the law a daily routine, a trademark of the Belarusian political system. First, this allowed the regulative function of the legal system to be turned into an instrumental function, which helped to establish control over society and prevent its reverse influence on the state. Second, breaking the law on every level of the state system is an extra factor that bonds the ruling elite internally. Third, the fact that the law does not defend people’s rights makes the individual dependent on the state. As Stanislaw Bahdankevich put it: “for protection from the will of the authorities, the population turns to the authorities themselves3.”

The regime carries out its directive-based style of management without reference to the law, and it is precisely the system of social regulation in which a majority of the population feels secure. Most people who find the legal situation in Belarus abnormal connect this fact with the policy pursued by Alyaksandar Lukashenka. These people are his potential opponents, and representatives of the regime view them as a “deviant” group.

The abolishment of general rules strengthens the present system of domination, although it also destroys the state system. As power concentrates, the anonymous character of its exertion results in its dependence on specific persons, which eventually undermines the state’s autonomy. Lacking in autonomy, the state loses its authority: formalised bureaucratic procedures are replaced by wilful decisions, easy to make but needing formal institutions to be fulfilled. However, it is on the abolishment of those institutions that the present regime is based. Therefore, despite the formal expansion of the state’s authority, in reality state control is carried out selectively.

The institutional degradation of Belarusian society destroys the common logical field of relations among separate elements of state as well as between the state and society. Therefore, the problem of the regime’s legitimacy in Belarus is replaced by another, the problem of the state’s degradation as a social institution.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1996

Mikhail PASTUKHOW, Alyaksandar VASHKEVICH

INTRODUCTION

Unprecedented for Belarus, the Constitution adopted on March 15, 1994, established the Constitutional Court, a special body for constitutional supervision. The constitution contained a separate chapter with eight articles that regulated its competence and the manner of setting up the Court as well as the legal status of its judges. This chapter in Section IV of the Fundamental Law was titled “State Inspection and Supervision” thus stressing a special status of the Constitutional Court in the system of state institutions.

On March 30, 1994, 15 days after the adoption of the Constitution, Parliament passed a law concerning the Constitutional Court, comprising four sections and 57 articles1. Symbolically, this was the same day the Constitution came into effect.

There were 40 candidates for the 11 vacancies on the Constitutional Court. Parliament approved only 8 of the 40, and added one more during the session. Thus, on April 28, 1994, a special session of the Supreme Soviet elected a plenipotentiary composition of the Constitutional Court (under Article 12 of the above-mentioned law, the Court is competent to function and rule with at least seven elected judges). Two additional judges completed the composition of the Court after a by-election held on May 25, 1996.

Several of the 11 judges had earlier occupied high positions in the executive branch, such as deputy Minister of Justice, deputy Minister of Interior, head of government’s legal department, aide to the director of the scientific research department of the KGB’s Higher School, and deputy chairman of the Supreme Assessment Commission. Two of the judges had earlier worked for the Supreme and Minsk City courts. Their other colleagues previously worked as head of the legal department of the Supreme Soviet secretariat, department chairman of the Police Academy, and two readers of the constitutional law chamber of Belarusian State University. The initial composition of the Constitutional Court comprised three doctors and three candidates of law; with one of the doctors, Valery Tsikhinya, being a correspondent member of the Belarusian Academy of Science.

The Constitutional Court defined its place in the political system of society during its first years of work. The Court heard more than 40 cases considering the constitutionality of presidential decrees and edicts as well as governmental resolutions. The majority of the cases involved the rights and freedoms of the individual.

It is worth noting that during 1995–96, the Constitution was primarily violated by president Lukashenka. His edicts often replaced laws in effect and breached people’s constitutional rights and freedoms. By November 1996 the Constitutional Court had struck down, in part or in whole, 17 edicts and 1 directive issued by the president.

The Constitutional Court found itself in the middle of the November 1996 conflict, when president Lukashenka proposed a nation-wide referendum. On November 4 the Court granted the request, filed by Supreme Soviet chairman Syamyon Sharetski, to consider the case of the referendum involving the consultative nature of changes and amendments to the constitution. Shortly before voting day, on November 19, the Court received a proposal from 73 MPs to initiate impeachment proceedings against president Alyaksandar Lukashenka. Due to reasons explained below, the Court was unable to issue a final ruling.

Based on the results of the November referendum, Lukashenka introduced a new constitution that redistributed the competence of the main organs of state power. The six judges, including the chairman, who did not acknowledge the new constitution were asked to resign, which they did. Judge M. Pastukhow, who did not submitted a resignation, was dismissed “in connection with the termination of his term as judge.” In January 1997, the Constitutional Court was reformed. The chairman, R. Vasilevich, and five judges were appointed by a presidential edict, the other six were “elected” by the upper house of the National Assembly.

As a result, the Constitutional Court in Belarus was appointed by president Lukashenka and is answerable to him alone. It is noteworthy that during the more than four-year period in which the Court has been sitting, it has yet to review a single edict or decree by the president.

THE PROCEDURE OF ESTABLISHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF JUDGES

Under Article 126 of the Belarusian Constitution, the Supreme Soviet elects the 11 member Constitutional Court from among qualified professionals in the field of law. The law concerning the Constitutional Court maintains that a citizen of the Republic of Belarus with a degree in law, who is highly qualified in the field of jurisprudence and has high moral standards can be elected to the court.

According to Part 5 of Article 100 of the Constitution, the candidacy for chairperson of the Constitutional Court is submitted to Parliament by the president, while Article 13 of the law on the Constitutional Court provides that the members of the court elect the chairman. The position remained vacant for more than a year, as Dzmitry Bulakhaw, chairman of the parliamentary commission for legislation and the candidate proposed by the president, failed to get enough votes in Parliament.

Under Article 13 of the law, in the absence of a chairperson or deputy chairperson, or if those officials are unable to carry out their duties, the competence of chairperson goes to the oldest judge; in this case Valery Tsikhinya, who was eventually elected chairman of the Court on March 23, 1995, after his candidacy was submitted by president Lukashenka. Valery Fadzeyew was elected deputy chairman in open voting.

The Chairman of the Constitutional Court is elected for a five-year term, and may be re-elected “for the remainder of the tenure as judge2.” Therefore, the chairperson’s term could be longer than five years. Strangely, the law did not specify a term for deputy chair, which enables the person elected to remain in this office for the entire 11﷓year tenure as judge.

However, due to the fact that logistical support was provided to the Constitutional Court “in the form determined by the president,” it was difficult to follow the above-mentioned provisions of the law. For example, in June 1994 the Council of Ministers decided to assign a personal car to each judge, the chauffeur also being the judge’s bodyguard. The first time the Court ruled a presidential edict as unconstitutional, the personal cars and bodyguards were “detached.” The number of automobiles at the Court’s disposal decreased proportionally to the number of presidential edicts rejected by the court. By November 1996, only the chairman had access to a car.

THE COMPETENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Article 132 of the Belarusian Constitution reads: “The competence, organisation and procedure of the Constitutional Court are determined by the law.” Therefore, the Constitution did not limit the competence of the Court; partly it was asserted in the respective law. Generally, it was much narrower than that of its counterparts in most European countries. The Belarusian Constitutional Court did not have the right to rule on the conformity of political parties to the Constitution, interpret the Constitution, or hear constitutional complaints by individuals.

The Court’s main task, under Article 125 of the Constitution, was to monitor the compliance of state laws and acts with the Constitution. Under Article 127, this included a) laws; b) international treaties and other obligations of Belarus; c) legal acts of international entities of which the Republic of Belarus is a signatory (this primarily applied to acts adopted within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); d) presidential edicts; e) normative acts of the Supreme and Supreme Economic Court as well as the Prosecutor General.

Acts under categories a) and b) were subject to review for compliance with the Constitution as well as international legal acts endorsed by Belarus, while c), d), and e) were also subject to review for conformity with Belarusian legislation.

The Constitution lists entities empowered to submit cases to the Constitutional Court:

1) the president; 2) the chairman of the Supreme Soviet; 3) a permanent commission of the Supreme Soviet; 4) a group of at least 70 Supreme Soviet deputies (out of a Parliament of 260); 5) the Supreme Court; 6) the Supreme Economic Court; 7) the Prosecutor General. The only recourse for other state institutions, non-governmental organisations, or individuals was to request one of the above-mentioned entities to submit a case before the court.

During the first two and a half years of the Constitutional Court’s existence, it was most frequently addressed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, permanent parliamentary commissions, and groups of MPs. Between 1994 and 1996, the Court ruled on 46 legal acts, striking down in whole or in part 13 laws, 4 resolutions of the Supreme Soviet, 17 presidential edicts, one presidential directive, 3 resolutions of the government, one resolution of a Supreme Court plenary and one decision made by the executive committee of the Minsk City Council.

The legal status of the Belarusian Constitutional Court was unique, which distinguished it from the majority of its European counterparts: it had the right to initiate a review of any act of any state institution or non-governmental organisation with respect to its conformity with the Constitution, other Belarusian laws, or international acts ratified by Belarus. It is worth noting that the Constitutional Court frequently employed this right, especially in the beginning, which caused accusations of “juridical activism” and was undoubtedly one of the factors that inspired Lukashenka’s constitutional reform of autumn 1996.

Another element of the Court’s competence, not mentioned by the Constitution but provided by Articles 36 and 44 of the law on the Constitutional Court, was the requirement to prepare an annual report concerning compliance with the constitution in the country. The report was drafted by the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court, then reviewed by its judges and members of the Scientific Consultative Council. A second draft was then considered during a session of the Court, which if approved was finally signed by the chairman.

The first annual report was approved on January 27, 1995. It evaluated the practice of state institutions in terms of their compliance with the Constitution, and included proposals aimed to improve current legislation. The first report set a standard for future annual reports.

The report of the Constitutional Court adopted on February 9, 1996 and submitted to the president and Supreme Soviet, caused an especially broad-scale response among the public and within political circles. The report assessed compliance with the constitution as unsatisfactory. The Court maintained that the illegal accumulation of executive branch power entailed diminishing of the role and significance of the other branches of power; moreover some laws had been replaced with more specific, but contradictory acts3.

The Constitution and law on the Constitutional Court did not give it the right to legislative initiative: the Court was not authorised to table bills to Parliament. Article 130 of the Constitution gave the Court the right to propose to the Supreme Soviet changes and amendments to the Constitution, as well as to propose the introduction of new laws and change existing laws. Such proposals were subject to mandatory consideration by Parliament. The Constitutional Court issued its annual reports concerning compliance with the constitution in the country on the basis of Article 130. The report of February 9, 1996, suggested the Republic of Belarus introduce the office of Ombudsman; amend the Constitution allowing the Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution; and establish penalties for not complying with rulings of the Court (the latter suggestion was adopted by Parliament in June 19964).

The Constitutional Court was part of the mechanism of determining the accountability of president. Under Article 104, the president could be dismissed for violating the Constitution or committing a crime. The issue of dismissing the president could only be submitted by a group of at least 70 MPs. It was the Constitutional Court’s task to establish whether the president violated the Constitution; in case of a positive ruling the president was suspended from fulfilling his duties until the Supreme Soviet made a final decision.

AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED RULINGS OF THE 1ST CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The Constitutional Court heard a number of cases related to people’s rights and freedoms, asserted by the Constitution and other laws of Belarus. The Court’s main focus was on the legal protection of citizens’ rights in the fields of labour, civil and administrative relations.

The Constitutional Court moved to defend the civil and political rights and freedoms of the people when considering the constitutionality of presidential edict No. 336 “On Selected Measures to Ensure Stability, Law and Order in the Republic of Belarus,” dated August 21, 1995.

The said edict suspended the activity of the Free Trade Union and the Minsk Underground worker’s cell of the trade union of railroad and transport construction workers of Belarus; the Public Prosecutors Office was authorised to bring suits against these trade union organisations requesting they be banned. The edict also implied the termination of political parties, trade unions, and other non-governmental organisations should they participate in strikes at any of the enterprises listed on Registry 158 passed by the Cabinet on March 28, 1995. Moreover, the edict suspended the immunity of deputies of the Supreme Soviet and local Soviets.

The Constitutional Court ruled that these actions by the president violate the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Belarus, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Labour Organisation’s convention “Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise,” endorsed by the Republic of Belarus.

In response to the appeal of the Supreme Soviet concerning the inadmissibility of monopolising the media, the Constitutional Court considered the constitutionality of three presidential edicts (No. 19 of August 4, 1994; No. 27 of August 5, 1994; and No. 128 of September 28, 1994) related to the operation of the “Belarusian Printing House” which dominated the newspaper production market. The abuse of power by some state officials resulted in some newspapers being published with blank spots in December 1994, which infringed the constitutional right of citizens to complete, reliable and timely information. The negative repercussions of that monopoly were felt in 1995, when the “Belarusian Printing House” cancelled contracts with a number of non-governmental publications thereby forcing them to seek printing facilities abroad.

The Constitutional Court also ruled that the National Television and Radio Company was not only a mass medium that dominated the field of television and radio, but that it had also assumed the characteristics of a central body of state control. This de facto consolidated its monopoly over the electronic media.

On this basis the Court ruled that individual provisions of the Statement on the National Television and Radio Company (presidential edict No. 128 of September 28, 1994) were unconstitutional. The Fundamental Law forbids the state, people’s associations, or individuals to monopolise the media.

In regard to the bill of October 6, 1994 concerning changes and amendments to the law “On Local Self-government and Local Economies in the Republic of Belarus,” the Constitutional Court ruled that the portion of the law abolishing local Soviets on the lowest level of the territorial division of the country conflicted with the Constitution.

In respect to Article 7 of the law on the Supreme Soviet and certain articles of the Regulations of the Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Court concluded that, contrary to the interpretation of the executive branch, the Constitution did not allow for the absence of a supreme representative and legislative body, which was the Supreme Soviet. On the basis of the Constitution and the law “On the Implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus,” the Court ruled the 12th Supreme Soviet was the legally valid legislative body until the 13th Supreme Soviet held its first session with the required quorum.

Presidential edict No. 383 of September 19, 1995, “On Reforming Local Administration and Self-governmental Bodies” eliminated Soviets and their bodies in city districts. In their place local administrations were formed in the districts as the successors to the executive committees of district Soviets. The edict also suspended elections to those Soviets. Later edicts (No. 481 and No. 485 of November 27 and 30, respectively) outlined the structure of local administrations and contained changes and amendments to the temporary provision concerning local administrations.

Having analysed the above edicts, the Constitutional Court ruled that the liquidation of local Soviets in town districts and their bodies as well as their replacement with local administrations conflicted with the Constitution and the law on local government and self-government, while the suspension of elections to those Soviets violated the Constitution and the law on elections to local Soviets.

THE CASE OF PRESIDENT LUKASHENKA’S IMPEACHMENT

Shortly before the constitutional referendum of November 24, 1996, 73 MPs petitioned the Constitutional Court to dismiss president Alyaksandar Lukashenka from office. The formal cause for the appeal was Lukashenka’s numerous edicts that violated the Constitution and infringed people’s basic rights and freedoms. A total of 18 edicts had been deemed unconstitutional.

However, the real reason for initiating the impeachment procedure was the fierce conflict between Lukashenka and Parliament. Under the veneer of a referendum, Alyaksandar Lukashenka and company had been preparing a coup aimed at increasing the personal power of the president. Democratic-minded MPs moved to block these attempts. Following a proposal by Syamyon Sharetski, Supreme Soviet chairman, and on its own initiative, the Constitutional Court reviewed the legality and constitutionality of the Supreme Soviet’s resolution of September 6, 1996, on holding a nation-wide referendum and measures to facilitate it. The Court ruled that it was not possible to put questions concerning changes and amendments to the Constitution in a mandatory referendum. The Court also ruled that the results of such a referendum may only be used in an advisory manner.

Following this ruling, issued on November 4, 1996, the Supreme Soviet amended its resolution of September 6, 1996, and admitted that the mandatory portion of the referendum included only the questions in regard to changing the date of Independence Day (Republic Day) and whether to elect heads of local executive bodies.

Unwilling to accept the Constitutional Court’s ruling of November 4 and the subsequent Supreme Soviet resolution of November 6, Alyaksandar Lukashenka issued two edicts in respect to the forthcoming referendum. Presidential edict 455 of November 5, established the sequence to implement decisions obtained via nation-wide referenda concerning changes and amendments to the Constitution; this edict violated the Constitution as well as the law “On Popular Voting (Referenda) in the Republic of Belarus.” Edict 459 of November 7 maintained that the Constitutional Court’s ruling of November 4 was null and void “as it essentially conflicted with the Constitution and limited the constitutional right of the people to participation in a referendum.” Moreover, the edict threatened state bodies that might hinder holding the referendum. According to the edict, such bodies would be terminated and those involved held accountable. This was, in fact, the introduction of full-fledged presidential rule.

Under these conditions, the Constitutional Court opened the case on November 19 concerning the allegation that president Alyaksandar Lukashenka had violated the Constitution. However, the case was not properly considered. The presidential administration applied unprecedented pressure on the judges. Valery Tsikhinya, chairman of the Court, was summoned twice to confidential meetings with Alyaksandar Lukashenka. After returning from those meetings, Tsikhinya repeatedly tried to persuade the judges to drop the case.

Enormous pressure was also applied to the deputies who had signed the impeachment appeal to the Constitutional Court. The unlawful behaviour on the part of the authorities (threats, blackmail, etc.) resulted in 12 of the MPs withdrawing their signatures prior to the case being heard.

Shortly before the hearing, a group of high-ranking Russian officials arrived in Minsk, including Viktor Chernomyrdin, Gennadiy Seleznyov, and Yegor Stroyev. Under their patronage, a tripartite “Agreement on the Socio-Political Situation and Constitutional Reform in the Republic of Belarus” was signed on the night of November 21/22 by president Lukashenka, who agreed to cancel his edicts on the mandatory nature of the referendum; speaker Sharetski, who was to ensure that the MPs would revoke their impeachment appeal; and Constitutional Court chairman Tsikhinya, who agreed to stop the proceedings concerning the president’s violation of the Constitution.

This agreement did not allow the Constitutional Court to hear the case on November 22, despite the presence of all the participants sitting in the court. Chairman Tsikhinya did not allow the hearing to begin and postponed proceedings until he received a letter from speaker Sharetski confirming that MPs revoked their signatures. However, a majority of deputies did not do so.

A final session of the Court was scheduled for November 26. However, that morning the central commission for elections and nation-wide referenda announced the “victorious” results of the referendum and the new version of the Constitution as having become legally binding. The presidential administration dissolved the 13th Supreme Soviet, as a result of which the Constitutional Court cancelled the case concerning the president’s violation of the Constitution on the pretext that members of the Supreme Soviet had revoked their signatures under the appeal.

CHANGE IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION

The new version of the Fundamental Law and the new Law on the Constitutional Court radically changed the status of the Court and its judges.

The new Constitution no longer contained a separate chapter specifically devoted to the legal status of the Constitutional Court. Instead of eight, the new version contained only one article relating to this body, tucked way at the end of the chapter “Court.”

Formerly, all members of the Court were elected by Parliament, whereas under the new Constitution (Part 3 of Article 116), six judges were to be appointed by the president, and six elected by the upper house (i.e., the Council of the Republic).

It is noteworthy that despite the explicit provision in the Constitution that six judges are to be elected, in reality they never have been. No alternative nominations have been submitted to Parliament, nor has Parliament debated the merits of the candidacies during its sessions that approved the judges. Moreover, the regulations of the Council of the Republic (not published officially) contain a rule under which all candidates for Constitutional Court judge can be suggested to the upper house only by the chairman of the Constitutional Court. In other words, the possibility of assigning a judge, without the blessing of the president, is absolutely eliminated.

The new versions of the Constitution and the Law on the Constitutional Court offer lower guarantees regarding the independence of judges. For example, the commission of a judge can be suspended and the judge can be arrested or face criminal charges “on presidential agreement.” Moreover, in certain cases, the president can dismiss the chairman or any judge (including those not appointed by him) at any time under Article 18 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

Under the amendment to the same law passed by Parliament on January 29, 1997, a judge is sworn in only once for the entire term of office in the Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, on March 4, 1997, president Lukashenka himself swore in a new body of judges including four judges from the court’s initial composition.

Substantial changes were made to the list of entities entitled to submit cases to the Constitutional Court. Entities that used to be particularly active in filing applications were removed. The Constitutional Court is no longer allowed to initiate a case. This is now the sole privilege of the president, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court (both appointed by president) as well as the Council of Ministers (prime minister appointed by the president and approved by the upper house, other members of government appointed by the president).

Under the new constitution, the Constitutional Court is not authorised to rule on the constitutionality of presidential acts, but is authorised to investigate (upon a presidential request) incidents of systematic or severe violations of the Constitution by houses of Parliament.

The Fundamental Law no longer mentions that rulings of the Constitutional Court are final and are not subject to appeal or protest. Neither does it state that direct or implicit pressure on the Constitutional Court or its members (in the fulfilment of official duties) is inadmissible and subject to legal accountability.

As a result, the Constitutional Court has turned from an active and independent organ of constitutional control into a legal institution with no initiative or position, subservient to the president and personally-controlled executive branch (administration, department of presidential affairs, security service, etc.). This transmutation is evident in the cases the new Constitutional Court has heard.

In the last four years, the new Constitutional Court heard 13 cases in 1997, 11 in 1998, 17 in 1999, and 28 in 2000. However, not a single presidential act has been ruled unconstitutional, despite the opinion shared by many prominent Belarusian scientists and experts that many presidential decrees and edicts are expressly unconstitutional and even violate the new version of the Fundamental Law. For instance, the infamous Decree No. 40 empowers the president to confiscate the property of legal or natural persons, which is contrary to the constitutional provision that the forced alienation of property can be carried out only under a court order.

Following these political and legal transformations, the status of the Constitutional Court in the system of organs of state power declined radically. The Court now serves more of a decorative function than that of a judiciary body of constitutional control. It is now limited to verifying the constitutional conformity of specific sections of laws, governmental resolutions, and ministerial acts. Regardless of the verdicts issued by the Constitutional Court, it has virtually no influence on the legislative situation and on human rights in the country.

THE STRUCTURE AND TRANSFORMATION OF ORGANS OF POWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS THE STRUCTURE AND TRANSFORMATION OF ORGANS OF POWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

Nina ANTANOVICH

The roots of authoritarianism in Belarus are to be sought not only in the mentality and the specific nature of the political culture, but also in the organisational and structural components of political power, as well as, and no less important, in the processes of executing the administrative and economic functions of the state. In connection with this, the following aspects of state management merit separate analyses: 1) the structure of organs of power; 2) the role of bureaucracy as an independent actor within the political system; and 3) corruption.

The system of state management of the Republic of Belarus has developed in several stages. The first covers the 1991–94 period and is characterised by a parliamentary system of government. During it the Soviet system was eliminated, sovereignty obtained, interest groups organised and a fragmented multi-party system developed.

The organs of state government in independent Belarus were recruited from professional functionaries of the Communist Party and Soviet state, comprising the former nomenclature, used to enjoying privileges during the Soviet era, of which the main privilege was holding a monopoly on power. The government of Vyachaslaw Kebich, appointed in May 1990, was mainly made up of this nomenclature, which was given the opportunity to re-divide a large share of public property. Democratic leader Stanislaw Shushkevich, elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet in September 1991, largely served as a screen for the nomenclature-dominated bureaucracy and was dismissed in January 1994.

For a number of reasons, both personal and institutional, the executive branch of power was incapable of efficient political management. It was decided to introduce a parliamentary-presidential system, reflected by the 1994 Constitution.

The first presidential elections and Lukashenka’s victory paved the way for another privileged group, less respectable in terms of social background but no less ambitious, to occupy the highest posts in government; the “old komsomolists and young communists.” As before, many of the country’s top-ranking managers, appointed in July 1994, had previously worked for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers, or its structures.

The second period, 1994–96, was conducted under parliamentary-presidential rule. This period was characterised by turbulent opposition between the president and Parliament, culminating in the constitutional crisis of autumn 1996. That year, the super-presidential system was installed.

The main “achievement” and result of that period was the creation of absolute rule by the higher organs of power. Until the first presidential elections, local bureaucracy was committed to Vyachaslaw Kebich. By using legislative mechanisms, Lukashenka easily did away with subtle doubts and past sympathies of local authorities. A reform of the system of local government was conducted and approved by Parliament in October 1994.

Changes to the Law on Local Government eliminated the system of Soviets as organs of local self-government, replacing them with a system of direct central management. All power on the local level was transferred to presidential structures: the “vertical” of power. The majority of present functionaries in the executive branch were born in Mahilyow region, and are personally indebted to the president for their careers.

Like other republics of the former USSR, the Republic of Belarus chose the parliamentary-presidential system of rule. However, this system proved shaky: it gave rise to conflict between the executive and legislative branches and experienced a series of political crises.

A parliamentary-presidential system formally still exists, the authority of the president was being steadily increased and legislatively asserted. This turned the executive branch into the dominant branch justified by the rhetoric of the need to form a centre of efficient political leadership. In practice, the fact that civil society is underdeveloped in Belarus allows this branch of power to operate without any checks and balances and furthermore, it has led to the abolishment of the separation of powers as such as well as any semblance of checks and balances. Absolute rule of the higher organs of power (the so-called “power vertical”) that has taken hold in Belarus is a monolithic administrative machine, a single bureaucratic body under the control of one man. This system of power organisation can be characterised as the method of production with the main exploiter being the state represented by the administrative-bureaucratic machine.

A detailed description regarding processes of structuring the organs of state management in the given period is presented below. After the presidential elections, the post of Prime Minister was occupied by Mikhail Chyhir, with deputy ministers including Mikhail Myasnikovich, Syarhey Linh, Uladzimir Harkun, and Viktar Hanchar. At the beginning of his term, Mikhail Chyhir gave a speech in which he proposed cutting the number of administrative offices, closing branch structures of ministries and reducing the number of ministers from 36 (under Kebich) to 24. However, these ideas, as well as that of introducing the “power vertical,” were not new. Kebich’s program speech, “We Are Standing at a Historic Crossroads” (March 1994), also included the following: “to strengthen sections of state management, expand the competence of ministries, eliminate 13 of them, reducing employment in them 12%” and “to delimit the functions of local authorities and representative power in the regions (local Soviets), resolutely cut the number of local representative bodies; chairmen of regional Soviets are to be approved by the head of the executive branch of government.” This quote is the best illustration of the status of the administrative-bureaucratic machine in the political system. Bureaucracy is a very stable and conservative component of the centre for political decision-making.

Another trend that began during the period of establishing the presidency (and continues to the present) is the growing role of the presidential administration in the management of the country. In 1994 Leanid Sinitsyn headed the presidential administration. Originally, this structure controlled personnel policy in state organs. For example, as early as in August 1994 the head of the presidential administration told an interviewer that the structure of the government had been defined and included 25 ministries and the State Security Committee (KGB).

One of the first sparks of conflict between the president and Parliament ignited in 1994, when the introduction of a presidential affairs department caused a heated argument. Speaker Mechyslaw Hryb bitterly criticised presidential edict No. 9 concerning the introduction of this department and demanded portions be stricken stating that the presidential affairs department would be responsible for financial, technical, logistical and social assistance provided to the Supreme Soviet.

The Main Department of State Security was established in September 1995 as an independent organ of state control under the president, directly subordinate to the president and State Secretary of the Security Council, for the purpose to protecting objects of national significance. Col. Mikhail Tsesavets, a former Supreme Soviet deputy, was the first director of the department.

The share of so-called security organs in the state system is physically quite large. According to various estimates the Ministry of the Interior, KGB and Presidential Guard employ approximately 120,000 people.

LEVELS OF DECISION-MAKING

In Belarus, highest authority in the hierarchy of power belongs to officials whose status is not defined by the country’s Fundamental Law. The actual system of decision-making does not coincide with constitutional bodies of state management. The basic levels on which decisions are made are outlined below.

The first (i.e., the highest) level is the presidential administration or more precisely, its top ranks: approximately one hundred people who have about 90% of state property at their disposal.

The second highest level comprises the mid-level echelon of the presidential administration, the Security Council, the Committee for State Control and the KGB.

The Council of Ministers, the 24 Ministries, and 18 State Committees*, comprise the third level, while local executive and administrative bodies comprise the forth.

State officials are totally dependent on their superiors from higher levels of the power hierarchy, both administratively and financially. Moreover, anyone in authority can fall victim to presidential decisions at any time.

A separate group comprise directors of large state-run enterprises, collective farm managers, and members of Parliament.

In terms of decision-making, the degree of centralisation in today’s Belarus is greater than in the former BSSR. The integral system of state management as it currently exists is merely a driving mechanism linking the president and the people. It is interesting that the monopoly of executive power has been established by means of legislative regulations (which was also the case with the Soviet practice employed in state administration), as an attempt to preserve the paternal role of the state.

Structurally, the Belarusian political system is characterised by distribution being dominated by the executive branch. The phenomenon of “power-property,” when power is primary and property serves only as its function, gives the administrative bureaucracy an indisputable right to redistribute all values and benefits in a centralised fashion. The domination of a re-distributive form of public politics is combined with the leading role of bureaucracy and a high probability of violence. As a result, power exceeds the status of an instrument - it becomes a supreme value in itself.

BUREAUCRACY AS AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR

In Belarus, functionaries privatise their managerial functions. Their competence, field of activity, and even office tasks become their personal resources. This is evidenced by the complicated procedure of registering private businesses, permanent campaigns of re-registering entrepreneurs, licensing various kinds of activity, possible financing from the budget, providing valuable information, and so on. High-ranking officials put what is called a “roof” (of patronage) over businesses, reaping high dividends. Springs of market economy are the most vital resource of bureaucracy. One can be confident that a sector of market economy will remain no matter how much stronger state power might grow.

Belarus’ market has become over-centralised and competition limited; meanwhile, bureaucratic structures have become “bourgeois.”

The administrative machine in Belarus can be seen as either having a solid social and financial stature or being very unstable.

Considering the first assumption: bureaucracy stands firm. There are presently 108,000 Belarusians employed in state management as opposed to 73,000 in the 1980’s, during the BSSR era.

There are many ways of allowing a functionary to earn money, even without using “extrabudgetary” funds: barter operations and mutual operations between companies, currency trading, supervising the gas and oil business, an opportunity to become a patron of a private notary or auditor or access to the distribution of state housing. There are also many privileges for functionaries: special medical services, prestigious education free of charge, cut-rate referrals to the best sanatoriums, prizes, and titles. Much higher than the opportunity for “privatising” managerial functions, top level officials value the possibility to “partake in the civilised world” in the form of foreign delegations and expenses covered in hard currency. The ultimate for top level officials is a diplomatic assignment abroad and a humble contribution in breaking through the international isolation of Belarus.

As to why the position of the bureaucracy is shaky, many employees in the institutions of power are being tied to the regime by material, political and personal obligations. The instability of these people is defined by a personal vassal-like dependence on the patron and the risk of being victimised by a corruption-fighting campaign.

Lukashenka and the official media often threaten and humiliate the administrative-bureaucratic machine with passages such as: “aggressive and cowardly circle of functionaries” (“Znamya Yunosti” (Banner of Youth), June 16, 1998); “functionaries wallow in intrigues and squabbles”, the root of solving social problems is in “restraining uncontrolled and corrupt officialdom — the real power that had towered above us” (“7 Dney” (7 Days), March 21, 1998).

Corruption is an excellent target for gaining political capital. Examples of this include the “suitcases of indictments” and the lists of the corrupt drawn up by Alyaksandar Lukashenka while in the Supreme Soviet. His election was followed by the notorious case of Heorhi Markowski, dismissed as Minister of Forestry due to accusations of abuse of office and lack of responsibility. Another dismissal in September 1994 involved Defence Minister Pavel Kazlowski and his demotion to lieutenant-general for “abuse of office” (the post of Defence Minister was later occupied by Anatol Kastenka, Leanid Maltsaw, Alyaksandar Chumakow and again by Leanid Maltsaw).

These events show a pattern: on one hand, shrew functionaries are threatened and openly blackmailed, on the other, they fight for resources by eliminating the competition.

Examples of real corruption are the Mahmud Esambayev Foundation and the company Torgexpo (both founded in 1995). In 1996 these two entities, exempt from taxation, excise duties, and VAT, were engaged in moving transit goods through Belarus to Russia. As a result of this activity, from 1995 to February 1996, the Belarusian state budget lost USD 320 million, or 11% of the national income. Another example is Belspetsvneshtorg Company, founded by presidential edict No. 291-18 of August 1, 1995, for “the efficient use and sale of released weapons, military materiel, and products of the military-industrial complex.” A scandal erupted when the company sold a number of MIG-29s to Peru.

Campaigns for punishing negligent managers, strengthening labour discipline, and fighting corruption always have two objectives. Externally, they are to influence public opinion to increase the authority of power; internally, to control the inner circle in order to prevent scheming and intrigue.

The presidential higher organs of power in Belarus are not so much a prop as a hostage of current state policy. The style of “telephone conferences,” open insult and humiliation of managers on all levels have become normal practice of employer-employee relations. According to polls conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (July 2001), approximately 80% of members of the vertical were displeased by the present state of affairs.

Some of the regime’s functionaries have dared to openly protest against the system of power, such as, Ivan Tsitsyankow, the former director of the presidential affairs department. Uladzimir Stsyapanaw, deputy chairman of the Berastse regional executive committee, voluntarily retired in May 2001. Viktar Chykin, chairman of the State Television and Radio, requested leave in June that year. Among those remaining most loyal to Lukashenka are Viktar Sheyman, Ural Latypaw, Uladzimir Zamyatalin, Leanid Kozik, Piotr Prakapovich, Mikhail Myasnikovich, Alyaksandar Abramovich, Vasil Dauhalyow, and Mikalay Damashkevich.

THE BELARUSIAN NOMENCLATURE AND LINES OF CLEAVAGE IN IT. LUKASHENKA’S CADRE POLICY THE BELARUSIAN NOMENCLATURE AND LINES OF CLEAVAGE IN IT. LUKASHENKA’S CADRE POLICY

Piotra NATCHYK

At the beginning of the 1990’s, Belarus was an industrial and agricultural republic on the western border of the USSR. As a result, the following factors exerted an influence on relations among the Belarusian nomenclature elite.

1. The industrial factor which produced the industrial lobby comprising a group of managers of large enterprises and the leaders of territorial administrations, within whose competence those enterprises were located and whose career prospects depended on the success of those companies. As the republic was oriented toward the Union centre, this group tried to improve their position in the relationship with the centre, choosing the strategy of gradually installing their representatives in Union institutions.

2. The agrarian factor. In a country with a large agricultural sector, the elite was recruited either by appointment from the centre or by promotion from the body of agriculture managers. Given the weaker contacts with the Union centre (compared to the industrial lobby), this group concentrated more on retaining their influence in their local areas rather than expanding it to the central authorities.

3. Situated on the western edge of the USSR, it was inevitable that the Belarusian elite was strongly influenced by the group of functionaries from state security and the border guard.

More or less distinct groups of nomenclature elite began to crystallise in the BSSR as late as after the Second World War. Prior to the war, central totalitarian rule used a special staff policy and repression to bar the promotion of regional party functionaries to the republic’s organs of power. The domination of people appointed by Moscow that arrived from Russia did not allow sustainable connections to be formed within the Belarusian administration.

However, in the first decade after the war personal and informal relationships that had developed among commanders and members of partisan detachments and underground cells during the war laid the foundation for a new system of interparty relations in Belarus in the 1950’s–60’s.

This first wave of internally structured nomenclature elite came to be referred to as “the partisan elite.” Most of its members were bound by shared memories of the partisan movement or underground Party and Komsomol organisations.

Until 1956, first secretary of the CPB Central Committee had never been a local Belarusian (Pantselyaymon Panamarenka, Mikalay Husaraw, Mikalay Patolichaw arrived from Moscow). In 1956, Kiryla Mazuraw, a representative of the national elite, headed the Communist Party of Belarus. His arrival began a series of indigenous appointments. In the mid-1960’s, 8 out of the 16 functionaries in influential Party posts in the Minsk region had a “partisan youth” background. The republic’s last “partisan” leader was Piotr Masheraw.

Relations within the partisan elite were built on the principles of classic clientelism. The main areas of recruitment were the regions of Vitsebsk and Berastse. The main achievement of that generation of the Belarusian elite was building an original Belarusian staircase for ascending to elite posts through personal relations.

During the 1960’s and 1970’s, a considerable number of large-scale industrial enterprises were built and expanded in the BSSR. It was during this period that the Belarusian Party and economic hierarchies began to mould the next generation of elite — the industrial elite. The first knot of relations between the elites, who would have a large influence on re-apportioning the division of power in the country even in the post-Soviet era, was tied as the industrial elite consolidated in the 1970’ and 1980’s. The new, industrial elite rose on the basis of Party organisations inside large enterprises. The main generator of this elite was Minsk, with the most important representatives being CPB leader Mikalay Slyunkow and his associates.

As a result, in the early 1980’s the BSSR had two competing models of elitist relations: the industrialist model of the national central elite and the agricultural model of regional elites.

The former proved highly efficient in thrusting functionaries up the hierarchy but was less effective as a system of organising local management. The latter provided fewer prospects for attaining Union-level authority but allowed control to be retained on the regional level.

The national central elite mainly comprised former members of party organisations of large industrial enterprises*.

Meanwhile, regional elites remained predominantly agrarian, had little access to the imperial centre, but the cadre was also subject to limited influence from the centre.

By the time the USSR collapsed, Belarus had not developed a tradition for distributing offices that closely tied regional elites with that of the centre. They coexisted in an isolated fashion, using different models of recruiting members and distributing positions. Their aims also varied. The channels from the national centre to the Union centre and vice versa, as well as those from the Union centre to a region of the republic were much more influential than that between the republic’s centre and regional centres.

Opposing interests of the central (industrial) and regional (agrarian) elites in relations between the national centre and regions resulted in conflicts between industrialists and agrarians on the regional level**.

Therefore, as perestroyka was rolled out the regional and national elites had differing aims and motives. The agrarian-industrial regional elites lacked the channels, resources, skills as well as motivation to influence the national elites. Both simply followed the initiatives of the Union centre. It was the election to the 12th Supreme Soviet (leading to Belarus declaring independence and the Supreme Soviet becoming the real centre of the country’s political life), that began a new phase in the development of the elite. The election paved the way to the centre for many representatives of the regional nomenclature. Regional functionaries comprised more than half of the 12th Supreme Soviet: 14 % were collective farm managers, 21.5 % regional administrators and 29.5 % Party officials. The republican Party and state nomenclature comprised only 10 % of Parliament, where many regional and national politicians debuted.

The central Party nomenclature was not ready for the new relations of power that emerged in newly independent Belarus. With the abolishment of the CPB, top Party functionaries lost power and almost disappeared behind the political horizon. (This change was promptly used by the “Communists of Belarus for Democracy,” a reform-oriented group of 50 MPs, whose most clamorous representative was Alyaksandar Lukashenka. None of the members of the faction ranked higher than that of enterprise or farm executive.)

The top posts were now occupied not by Party nomenclature, but by the nomenclature of the central organs of state administration, who were less influential and less able to control the regions. Prime Minister Vyachaslaw Kebich, sensing the loss of control, allowed his deputy Mikhail Myasnikovich to co-ordinate relations with the regions.

The only group to retain organisational potential was the elite of law enforcement (KGB, Ministry of Interior, etc.). Their influence was evident by the fact that the Kebich government repeatedly tried to restrain it. For example, one of the major administrative and personnel changes planned as early as 1992 was reform of the organs of state management, which was to include a partial dissolution of the KGB and the liquidation of military intelligence. In December 1993, Parliament considered dissolving the KGB and transferring its responsibilities to the Ministries of Interior and Defence. It was proposed that the border guard establish a unit for “special active measures” (the Belarusian acronym ASAM), an elite detachment of the border guard. KGB Chairman Eduard Shyrkowski and Interior Minister Uladzimir Yahoraw accused Henadz Danilaw, State Secretary for Crime Prevention and National Security, of excessive patronage, a dictatorial management style and attempting to establish ASAM as a parallel (unconstitutional in their opinion) special service to counterbalance the corresponding department of the KGB.

The authority of the old nomenclature elite among society plummeted in the early 1990’s, while the national democratic forces began to gain influence. The declaration of independence as well as the meetings and strikes of 1991 showed the serious potential of national democratic groups in the country, their ability to influence society and summon mass protest rallies. They became a threat to the political position of the nomenclature, as a result of which the move to introduce the office of president was initiated. Between the first presidential elections and 2001, the evolution of the Belarusian elites has passed through several phases.

The first phase can be called parliamentary, or pseudo-democratic. As stated above, until the mid-1990’s the Belarusian nomenclature elite did not have any distinct currents within it. As president, Alyaksandar Lukashenka began to pursue a cadre policy mainly consisting in assigning top officials according to their personal contacts and regional connections. This included functionaries he had known in the Mahilyow region and his parliamentary partners.

Within two months of being elected president Lukashenka made 57 significant appointments. Exactly one third of these people (19) had been MPs and most were given top-ranking positions. At this early stage Lukashenka employed a regional model of assignment. Among the 19 former MPs, 7 had campaigned for him during the run-up to the election, and at least 5 came from his home area, the Mahilyow region. The majority of the others had occupied offices one level lower in the same branch of state management.

Lukashenka also handed out top-ranking positions to former members of the nomenclature elite. Mikhail Myasnikovich remained first deputy prime minister and Syarhey Linh retained the office of deputy for economic affairs. As deputy prime ministers for agriculture and cultural-educational affairs, former MPs Uladzimir Harkun and Viktar Hanchar found themselves relatively lower down the pecking order.

Those assignments followed the old model: from the national centre to the regional centres, with no regard to regional specifics. The vague character of the central elites and the isolation of the regional elites allowed Lukashenka to reform organs of local government without significant opposition from the regions. Under the new system, the chairmen of local administrations were assigned from Minsk, generally on the basis of personal sympathy of the president.

Parliament once again became the base of regional leaders. Of the six regional administration chairmen, three had been members of the 12th Supreme Soviet, and five had previously occupied regional posts. However, the reform also highlighted regional trends in forming the elite: most chairmen of local administrations (primarily on the district level) were recruited from the periphery, even if supported by the president.

The reform led to the first distinct conflict between differing interest groups within the presidential entourage, of which after 1994 there were three: the old elite, the police and military forces, and MPs (or media politicians). The “Mahilyowans” could be singled out, although the participation of this group in most relations was only nominal. It was represented in all of the above-mentioned trends without comprising an organised entity.

The main representative of the old elite was Mikhail Myasnikovich*, who had worked in the Belarusian government since 1986, rising in the ranks from Minister for Housing and Municipal Services to Deputy Prime Minister. In the Kebich government, Myasnikovich was responsible for the industrial-economic sphere; having enormous connections with domestic regional elites and foreign elites. The main function imposed on that elite group was to provide economic viability to the state system established by Lukashenka. It was through Myasnikovich that Lukashenka maintained contacts with Moscow and representatives of the national industrial and banking elites. Most ministers connected with industrial and other economic activities (including the above-mentioned Syarhey Linh, Barys Batura, as well as Minister of Trade Valyantsin Baydak and Minister of Industry Uladzimir Kurankow) preserved their seats during the first waves of new appointments in state institutions that followed Lukashenka’s election. Such was the case with Agriculture Minister Vasil Lyavonaw of the Mahilyow clan, Lukashenka’s former patron who maintained his connections with agrarian elites.

The first appointments left members of the old nomenclature with leading positions in the financial and economic fields, providing continuity of policy and the system of distributing power*.

In the first months of Lukashenka’s rule, the greatest changes in cadre were made in law enforcement: the KGB, Ministry of Interior and the Border Guard. Leaders were replaced together with their deputies (unlike in other fields where some interval was generally maintained between two replacements). Yahoraw, dismissed in 1994 for opposing Danilaw’s group, returned as KGB chairman. Valer Kez, who had been dismissed once for co-operating with Lukashenka’s anti-corruption commission, was appointed his deputy. (Incidentally, both Yahoraw and Kez had worked in law enforcement for some time in the Berastse region, the home region of Viktar Sheyman, one of Lukashenka’s most active campaigners and one of the most influential people in his entourage. Sheyman was appointed Chairman of the Security Council, the country’s highest security body.)

The Ministry of Interior was given to Zakharanka, born in Homel region. All deputy ministers were replaced. Among the new appointments, some came from the Berastse region (Mikalay Krechka). All commanders of the border guard (the home of the ASAM special troop, created during the Kebich government as an alternative to its KGB counterpart) were also replaced.

In other ministries, only ministers were assigned anew and only selected deputies were replaced after some time.

The term parliamentary, or media elite seems appropriate for the new wave of functionaries who came to Lukashenka’s government and administration from Parliament. It is the most diverse, numerous, and volatile group. MPs or persons from parliamentary circles who came to work for the executive branch included such political antagonists as Viktar Hanchar and Viktar Sheyman, Yury Zakharanka and Ivan Tsitsyankow, Uladzimir Yahoraw and Inesa Drabyshewskaya. This was an eclectic group, the only common thread being that they all had supported Alyaksandar Lukashenka in the 1994 election. It was the members of this group that were the first to leave the presidential entourage due to the change of the regime’s policy and as a result of the struggle among the various groups of elites for influence. The exodus of the parliamentarians began with the departure of Viktar Hanchar in December 1994, coinciding with the peak of the campaign for the establishment of the presidential vertical and the first assignments of regional governors by the president. In Hanchar’s words, his dismissal was the result of his disagreement with the new system of power in which the importance and influence of the Council of Ministers was diminishing and all power was shifting to the presidential administration. In his opinion, his departure fit in with a “collective stand taken by the Cabinet of Ministers.” Incidentally, other parliamentarians (Leanid Sinitsyn) also quit referring to a “collective” opinion, although they resigned individually.

More organised and die-hard representatives of the two other groups (the old nomenclature and the police and military forces) gradually occupied the positions held by former parliamentarians. Thereafter, political intrigues were centred around fighting between these two groups led by Myasnikovich and Sheyman, respectively. Hanchar’s departure created a vacancy in the position of Deputy Prime Minister for a MP native of Berastse region, Uladzimir Rusakevich. His Berastse and parliamentary origin implies a connection with Sheyman and his group, which was now growing stronger. Indeed, during the next three months the “old nomenclature” lost positions. Most of the ministers with an economic and industrial profile were replaced (of those that had not already been replaced), namely the Ministers of Tade, Industry, Finance, and some of their deputies. Thus, the first wave of the parliamentarians’ exodus gave way to re-dividing areas of influence: the police and military forces gained more authority while the old nomenclature lost considerable influence.

These developments were played out against a backdrop of replacing the executives of industrial enterprises. Exchange rate speculations and a crisis of non-payments focused industries on the problem of survival and finally undermined the low-level economic elite (managers of state-owned and private industries, banks and other businesses). In addition, in September 1994, the government decided to renegotiate contracts with directors of industrial enterprises, which left the latter in a weaker position than during the Soviet era.

From the end of 1994 to 1996, at least 10 managers of large enterprises were replaced (according to official sources). The financial-economic elite was being neutralised as Myasnikovich and the group of apparachiks of the “the old nomenclature” were also losing influence. Their resources inside the country (the foundation of their power) were melting away as fewer and fewer directors of enterprises associated with them. The old elite required additional resources to exercise their influence