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Presentation – Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw
by Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga

Towards the end of last week I returned from Belarus. Over the course of 10 days I had the opportunity to meet with representatives of the Belarusian authorities (Foreign Office, Presidential Administration’s Analytical Institute) as well as the leaders of opposition parties, NGO activists and independent analysts – some of whom are with us here today.

My visit to Belarus was quite intense. A great number of interesting meetings surely demand deeper reflection and analysis. However, today I would like to share with you my initial, still very fresh thoughts and reflections from this trip. I think that it would be best to begin with a general overview of the current political situation in Belarus and then move to some more concrete conclusions and recommendations with regards to political parties and the third sector. 

Over the past few weeks in Belarus we have witnessed an intensification of activities on the part of the authorities against the independent press, NGOs and the (political) opposition. It seems that the intensification of the repressive mechanisms of internal politics can, above all, be attributed to Alexander Lukashenka’s the deteriorating international position, particularly in the cooling relations with Russia. The limiting of activities by democratic institutions is surely also an effort to cut them off from increasingly negative public opinion; particularly inopportune in this period when Lukashenka is preparing to insure himself of remaining in power beyond the end of his second term.

On 29 May (2003), the Belarusian Ministry of Information suspended the largest independent daily, Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta (BDG), from publishing over the following three months, charging the paper with publishing false information and misleading the public. The suspension also includes BDG’s monthly investigative–reporting supplement BDG – For Official Use Only, currently the only investigative journal in Belarus. The editor-in-chief of the daily tried to appeal the decision in court. The court dismissed his case as unfounded, which could have been expected since the courts are largely dependent on the administration. Currently BDG is trying to come out under cover of several hitherto unknown smaller newspapers (Echo, Salidarnasc’, Predprinimatelskaya gazeta) [Echo, Solidarity, Entrepreneur’s Gazette.] However the authorities have so far successfully made this practice more difficult by closing down these publications as well. This aside, it is rather difficult for a newspaper to reach its subscribers and devoted readers if it is forced to constantly change its masthead. A warning, which can lead to the closing or suspension of a newspaper, has also received by the independent daily Narodnaya Volya. The Belarusian correspondent of the Russian daily Izvestya, Alena Danejka, was summoned by the prosecutor and charged with attempting to sabotage the process of [Russian-Belarusian] integration after she authored an article in which she wrote about the waning of the Union. The satirical paper Navinki was closed for defaming the president. This series of events, the suspension of BDG in particular, has brought protests in support of freedom of speech from the OSCE and the USA among others.

The opposition is also facing problems. Siarhej Skrebcau, the leader of the Respublika group, which consists of members of the National Assembly who openly contest Lukashenka’s policies, is being accused of being the leader of a criminal gang. Investigation into this matter has begun, ignoring the fact that Skrebcau is (should be) protected by parliamentary immunity. Long-time activist of the Belarusian Popular Front, Juras Chadyka, has been arrested. While Anatol Labiedzka, leader of the United Civic Party, was summoned to the prosecutor where it was demanded he provide an explanation regarding material published on the party’s website which the prosecutor considered as offending the president’s dignity.

May was also a black month for the third sector. The courts received four [cases] regarding the liquidation of four organisations: Social-Christian Youth Union, Civic Initiatives in Gomel, Varuta in Baranovichi and the Grodno organisation Ratusha (whose head, Mr. Alaksadar Milinkievicz, is here with us today and can surely say more on this matter than I). The Gomel case involving Civic Initiatives has just been concluded with the judgement for closing the organisation being handed down. All four organisations were centres of civic activity in the Belarusian regions, uniting several local organisations and providing them with both technical and substantive support and helping them make contacts and seek funding.

It seems that the driving factor behind the increased aggressiveness of Belarus’ internal politics could be, among others, Alexander Lukashenka’s feeling (or perception) that his position is threatened as a result of a further episodes demonstrating cooling relations with Moscow. 

Of late, the Kremlin has evidently ignored the Belarusian president. Lukashenka’s declaration, delivered during his annual address, that he has an alternate radical plan for integration ready, evoked no reaction from Russia. Simultaneously, in the Russian president’s address, contradicting the practice to date, Belarus was treated simply as one of the CIS member states rather than a strategic ally. The meeting of the High Council, planned for the end of April, during which the Belarusian and Russian presidents were to sign a project on the Constitutional Act, never took place. Likewise ignored was Alexander Lukashenka’s publicly expressed desire for an earlier meeting with Vladimir Putin. Also, during the summit in St. Petersburg, Putin did not find time for Lukashenka during the festivities celebrating the city’s 300 year anniversary. Moreover, the head of the Russian electoral commission, Alexander Vyeshniakov announced that there will be no referendum in Russia, either this year or next, in the matter of accepting the Constitutional Act. In Belarus this was received as signalling a lack of support for a third term for the Belarusian president, which he likely was planning on legalising precisely by means of adding this question to the referendum ballot dealing with the union. Formally, this referendum should be carried out in both countries simultaneously. 

Lukashenka’s agitation is almost certainly also being exacerbated by the international situation. For the Belarusian president, who openly supported Saddam Hussein until the last moment, the swift victory of the coalition forces in Iraq was decidedly too swift for comfort. I was surprised as to the degree to which representatives of the authorities in Minsk were concerned that the United States would take a closer interest in the regime that supported Iraq. There is particular concern raised by the Belarus Democracy Act being prepared by US Congress – which concentrates on providing support to democratic circles within Belarus. There is also much excitement over rumours that Poland will host US army bases. Representatives of the Belarusian authorities with whom I spoke consider this eventuality to be likely and that it constitutes the single greatest threat to Belarus. 

Recent public opinion polls are likewise inopportune for Lukashenka. In March and April 2003 the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) conducted an annual nation-wide opinion poll. The poll showed that Lukashenka’s popularity continues to decline. Whereas in April 2001 he enjoyed 37 % support, and in last year’s poll 31%, this year only 26% declared that they trusted and supported him. Only 17% of those surveyed responded that they would support changes in the constitution that would allow Alexander Lukashenka to run for president a third term. It is significant that the president is losing the support of the backbone of his electorate – retirees. Only every second one (52%) would vote for him if elections were held today. Among those who voted for Lukashenka in 2001, only 40% said that they would vote the same way today.

The main factors influencing this loss of faith in the president are declining standards of living and lack of belief that there can be any significant improvements under the current administration. A significant factor influencing perceptions of the domestic situation is travel abroad. Those who have been abroad at least once in the past two years far more readily declare a readiness to see a change in leadership. 

To date, the decline in the president’s rating has not translated into increased support for opposition groups. Similarly, opposition parties did not receive higher ratings in this year’s poll. The most popular, the Liberal-Democratic Party headed by Siarhej Hajdukievicz (who ran as a presidential candidate in the last elections) is support by 6% of those polled. However, a considerable number of are aware and support the contesting parliamentary group “Respublika”. Over 33% of respondents expressed support for its activities. Support for the groups does not however translate into the popularity of its leader – MP General Fralov. The number of people declaring support for him can be counted within allowable margins of error. 

So what does all this mean for the Belarusian opposition, NGOs and for all of us who would like to see a democratic Belarus?

The most important event for the opposition and pro-democratic organisations are the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2004. All the political parties are starting to think about them. It seems that for all opposition leaders it is clear that their parties should participate in the elections. Even those who boycotted the last parliamentary elections talk of the pointlessness of undertaking such an action again and of the opportunities taking part in the election campaign hold. The most concrete proposals [plans] for the coming campaign have been set forth by the United Civic Party (UCP). They have suggested creating a list of 110 candidates and preparing an additional 110 as back-up candidates who would be prepared to step into the electoral ring should the main candidate be eliminated by the authorities. The experience of earlier elections shows that the elimination of rival (opposition) candidates is the authorities’ favourite way of beating down challengers from the opposition. The 110+110 list is to be a common opposition list comprised of members of all opposition parties and groups. Initial discussion between the UCP and Respublika indicate that both MPs who are part of the parliamentary grouping and representatives of the bureaucratic “nomenklatura” circles associated with it (e.g. Marynich, Lavonov) would be prepared to join the 110+110 initiative. Co-operation could be disrupted or undermined by the considerable ambitions of the heads of this group. 

The oldest opposition party, the Belarusian Popular Front, is also debating joining the initiative. It is concerned that too-close co-operation with the UCP threatens its identity. From the outset it declared that certain concepts governing the creation of the list must be modified so that, for example, in particularly attractive ridings (such as Minsk) opposition candidates can compete with one another. 

The third most significant opposition party, Mikola Statkievich’s Social Democrats, stated immediately that it wants to participate in the elections independently. Above all, one can not exclude the possibility of significant changes on the opposition political scene being brought on by the election campaign. Already at the beginning of June a new groups was formed – Democratic Bloc for a Free Belarus. The Bloc is primarily associated with the organisations Zubr and Charter ’97. It has declared that a battle or power and participation in the elections are its goals. 

It is clear that creating a single list uniting all the opposition groups is going to be very difficult, and perhaps even impossible. Moreover, it seems that the problem of uniting the opposition should not be requisite to co-operation. During the presidential elections in 2001 as a result of external pressures the opposition went to great lengths in order to unite, often in contradiction to their own views and beliefs. It is for this reason that the loss in the elections brought such disappointment, finger-pointing and questions regarding the wisdom of certain decisions taken during the campaign. However, during this time there arose a political potential, which was squandered to a significant degree. 
I believe that it should be assumed that the upcoming parliamentary elections can not bring any consequential success for the opposition. The election process is controlled by people loyal to the president. The experience from past elections demonstrates that results are to a great extent dependent on them rather than on the campaigning activities of the opposition candidates. It is not out of the question that the opposition will manage to win seats for some of its representatives. Considering the negligible role of the parliament in the Belarusian power structure and the utter disregard of the institution of parliamentary immunity by the president, the presence of opposition MPs would have a moral symbolic value than any practical importance. 

Participation in the elections can however be an excellent opportunity to reach out and work with society during the campaign, and moreover will be completely legal. The campaign should be a period of awakening social activism, civic-mindedness as well as building public trust in opposition political groups and above all raising awareness that such groups exist. For many groups their core problem remains the lack of wide spread awareness of their existence. The entire opposition must conquer the negative stereotype that has been created of it by pro-presidential propaganda and media. 

In this election, the opposition, whether united or not, should produce a programme that directly addresses as broad a segment of the Belarusian population as possible. The programme should consist of concrete projects that are possible to implement on the local level with results that can be easily observed. A good example of such projects is the “Zrabim lepsh” (“we’ll make it better”) movement, co-ordinated by the Assembly of NGOs, during which NGO activists tried to address the need of Belarusian citizens. During this project in 2003, on Health Day, information regarding how health care reform looks in practice was prepared and distributed. Another good example is the Belarusian Organisation of Working Women’s (BOWW) pilot project to inform residents about a new municipal law, activating residents, helping in the creation and functioning of residents’ unions and control over municipal budgets. These kinds of activities, since they involve interaction, demonstrate to the public the reasons to become involved work of NGOs and local-level opposition. They often succeed in activating those who previously had nothing to do with the third sector. 
Specific local projects can also serve as a basis for co-operation with the local nomenklatura. The experience of the Lev Sapieha Foundation shows that local administrators are prepared to accept the help of NGOs and co-operate with them on specific projects such the building of a new sewage treatment plant or renovating a bridge. Working with the nomenklatura is difficult since this group is often unable to make decisions independently, afraid of potential consequences from higher ups for taking the initiative or co-operating with foreign organisations. All the more reason to seize every possible opportunity for such co-operation. It seems that when political changes eventually occur power will fall into the hands of the nomenklatura rather than the opposition. Currently they are responsible for the continuing stability of the regime in the regions; it is they for example who are ultimately responsible for the fairness of the election process.

Attempts at co-operating with the civil service, attempts to influence a change in mind-set among civil servants should also be part of the larger plan of the Belarusian third sector. I believe that more efforts should be expended on a long-term strategy geared towards changing social consciousness rather than on short-term political actions such as election observation or street demonstrations. Aside from the projects mentioned previously I believe it important to work with youth and with those who have an influence on youth – teachers. Of particular importance are internships abroad which allow one to gain personal experience of life outside of Belarusian realities. If the consciousness of Belarusian society is not changed then political changed in this country will only inevitably end up with another Lukashenka. It is also worth paying attention to projects which seek to prepare plans for reforming individual state sectors. For now the opposition is not prepared to assume power. 

The final thought I wish to put forth, regardless of what strategy for co-operation with Belarus is adopted, concerns the strict control over funds transferred to NGOs and the opposition. All funds transferred to Belarus must have a clearly identified purpose and be intended for strictly identified people/groups/etc. The disbursal of funds is probably the main reason for the disenchantment of participants in a number of various events and has given rise to splits and conflicts among NGOs and political parties. Accusations and sore feelings make further co-operation difficult if not outright impossible; while spoiling the reputations of Belarusian organisations abroad as well as those of their western partners. 

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